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SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Obama administration recently suggested concluding a legally bind-
ing agreement on transparency that would confirm that American BMD
does not pose a threat to Russia’s deterrence forces, and also concluding
a framework agreement on further cutting Russian and American nuclear
arsenals. The USA may be interested in reducing the tensions with Russia
over the missile defense with a view to break the deadlock on a wide com-
plex of hard security and proliferation issues, including the hot problems
of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe and Iran and the North Kore-
an nuclear programs, and also to ensure Russia’s support in managing re-
gional crises – these days, especially that in Syria.
Moscow probably agrees that it should negotiate a legally binding agree-
ment on transparency and confidence building measures with the USA. At
the same time Russia continues in asking for legally binding guarantees
that the US BMD is not aimed against its strategic forces as the sine qua
none of any other talks and agreements on nuclear weapons with the US.
The Kremlin also may propose some trilateral consultations between the
USA, Russia, and Europe on BMD with a view to involve some European
circles that are skeptical about the missile defense in the debate.
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In a wider geopolitical context, Russia’s policy towards the BMD issue re-
sults from Moscow’s perception of the US quest for a compromise on
strategic problems as a weakness. The US quest for a compromise may
and most probably is used by Moscow to question the reliability of the
American alliance obligations.
It cannot be ruled out that there are plans for a certain “big deal” be-
tween the two countries, at the possibility of which Moscow hints. In the
context of this deal, Russia would consent to new negotiations on further
reductions of strategic nuclear weapons in exchange for the USA consent-
ing to limit its non-nuclear strategic systems, take into account the con-
ventional arms in Europe, limit the US naval activity in the seas around Eu-
rope and accept future Russian proposals on European security aimed at
enfeebling NATO.
Controversies about the US missile defense are among the core issues of the US-Russia
relationship. In particular, Moscowmakes its consent to discussing further nuclear arms
control and some other key matters of global and European security conditional on the
USA’s assent to “removing Russia’s concerns over America’s missile defense plans”. Over
a long period of time Russian-American relations on missile defense were in a deadlock;
yet some signals that were recently given by Washington and Moscow possibly indicate
that this state of affairs may change.
Russian and American stands
In 2010–2011, after the USA announced the Phased Adaptive Approach to the BMD in
Europe (EPEE), Russia suggested “sectoral” and/or “joint” European BMD systems as al-
ternatives to the US plan.1 Since the USA and NATO rejected these proposals, Russia’s ap-
proach to the US ballistic missile defense consisted of three main points.
Moscow insists that “Aegis Ashore” sites in Romania and Poland with a land-based Aegis
SPY-1 radar and 24 SM-3 interceptors each, the US’s Aegis-equipped BMD warships with
SM-3 interceptors, and the most powerful Ground Based Interceptors (GBI) stationed in
California and Alaska either are, will be, or may be (there are different wordings for this
in different documents and statements, depending on the circumstances) detrimental
to the Russian strategic nuclear forces. Mostly, Russian officials mentioned the deploy-
ment of the SM-3 Block IIB interceptors, a system that is still at the conceptual stage of
its development, in Poland and on board warships in the Barents Sea – that is, imple-
mentation of the fourth phase of the EPAA – as a threat.
In this light, Russia demands a legally binding agreement guaranteeing that the US mis-
sile defense is not and will not be aimed against Russian strategic missiles – both land-
and sea-based. Russia thus presumes to impose limits on the performance characteris-
tics of the American BMD components – above all, the interceptors’ burn-out velocity –
and on the geographical zones of their actual and potential deployment, including the
operating areas of the BMD warships.2 Sometimes, Russian diplomats and military com-
manders have mentioned such guarantees with regard to the US missile defense ele-
ments that are planned to be deployed in Europe and in the Mediterranean, the Black,
and the Barents Sea, yet mostly they spoke about the BMD in general, which meant that
in their view, such limits should be imposed for the BMD components stationed in the
USA and the seas nearby.
Finally, albeit during the last fewmonths Moscow did not mention its threat to take mil-
itary countermeasures in response to the US missile defense in Europe, including a pre-
emptive attack, this threat was not removed from Russia’s official stance.3
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The American and NATO positions can be expressed in a few basic points. Firstly, the NA-
TO missile defense is not directed against Russia; it is not and will not be able to under-
mine Russia’s strategic deterrence. Through transparency and cooperation with the Unit-
ed States and NATO, Russia would see that this system is designed for ballistic missile
threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Secondly, the USA and NATO seek to work
cooperatively with Russia. Thirdly, since “NATO alone bears responsibility for defending
the Alliance from ballistic missile threats … the United States and NATO cannot agree to
Russia’s proposals for ‘sectoral’ or ‘joint’ missile defense architectures”.4 And, fourthly,
“as ballistic missile threats continue to evolve”, the USA “cannot place limits or con-
straints on [its] ability to defend [itself], [its] allies, and [its] partners. This includes any
limitations on the operating areas of [its] BMD-capable multi-mission Aegis ships”.5
One may also remark that Russia has no technologies that are able to add value to the
American and NATO missile defenses. In particular, the idea of “sectoral” defense is
pointless since Russia has no interceptors that would be able to shoot down Iranian mis-
siles flying over its territory. Even the most advanced Russian systems, the S-300 PMU2
and the S-400, which potentially could be used in the missile defense, have a very lim-
ited vertical range against ballistic
targets – only up to 27–30 kilome-
ters, while Iranian missiles aimed
at targets in Europe will travel over
Russia at an altitude of a few hun-
dred kilometers. In their turn, the
American SM-3 Block IA/B interceptors can hit ballistic targets at altitudes of up to 250
kilometers. As for a “joint” system, Moscow had in mind that it should be based on the
“two buttons” principle in decision-making on launching the interceptors, which is
definitely unacceptable to the USA and NATO. Besides, the Russian suggestion that in-
formation from Russian early warning radars could be used in the European missile de-
fense was impractical, as this information can add almost nothing to the information
produced by American missile defense radars.
Finally, in order to guarantee that the US and NATO missile defense cannot undermine
Russian strategic forces it is necessary to limit the performance characteristics of most of
the components of a BMD system, including the speed, number and deployment of the in-
terceptors; the location of the radars; the operation speed of the computers; the detection,
tracking and surveillance aptitudes of the space based sensors; the ranges and resolutions
of the land based radars; the capability of the sensors on board the interceptors of the
exoatmospheric kill vehicles to seek the enemy’s warheads in space and discriminate them
from decoys, et cetera. It is hardly possible to agree on the concrete limits for such charac-
teristics; but even if such limits are decided upon, Russia most probably will demand a ver-
ification of the corresponding agreements, which means that it will have access to highly
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Russia has no technologies that
are able to add value to the
American and NATO missile
defenses
sensitive crucial military technologies. This is hardly acceptable for the USA, especially be-
cause any such agreement would in actual fact be one-sided, as it would introduce limits
on American programs for the simple reason that Russia is lagging behind America in the
corresponding areas of science and technology and will probably continue to do so.
New elements in the US approach to the BMD
and strategic nuclear arms control
On March 15, 2013 US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced that in order to
protect the country against the North Korean missile threat, the USA would deploy 14
additional GBIs in Alaska, which will increase their number from 30 to 44. In addition,
the USA delayed the implementation of the fourth phase of the EPAA until 2022, which
meant a delay in the deployment of the SM-3 Block IIB interceptors in Poland and on
board Aegis equipped warships.6 American officials said that the restructuring of the
fourth phase of the EPAA in no way resulted from Russia’s objections but was only
caused by technological difficulties and budget considerations. However, a number of
American and Russian experts acknowledged that a delay in the deployment of the SM-
3 Block IIB in Europe may stimulate Russia to look for a compromise with the USA on
the BMD. It was exactly the apparent deployment of these potentially most advanced
interceptors that Moscow used in arguing against the missile defense in Europe.
A month later, in mid-April 2013, Tom Donilon, the National Security Advisor in the
Obama Administration, delivered to Vladimir Putin the US president’s letter containing
a number of proposals aimed at easing the tensions and seeking ways to cooperate. Al-
beit Obama’s letter was not made public, the usually well-informed Russian newspaper
Kommersant said that it had the text of the document. The newspaper revealed that its
key idea was “to reaffirm that the US and Russia are two great powers performing a spe-
cial historic mission and should jointly address global issues rather than argue over tri-
fles”.7 Of principal importance for Russia were two of Obama’s suggestions: firstly, the
two countries were “to develop and conclude a legally binding agreement on trans-
parency, which would include exchange of information to confirm that [the two coun-
tries]” (BMD – Y. F.) programs do not pose a threat to each other’s deterrence forces’
and, secondly, they were to conclude a framework agreement on further cutting their
nuclear arsenals.8 Both of the agreements proposed by president Obama imply that the
proposed agreements would be sole-executive agreements, for which the president does
not need to seek the consent of Congress.9
The transparency agreement proposed by the US administration may require declassify-
ing data on the American missile defense characteristics, and the burn-out speed of inter-
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ceptors is mostly mentioned in this context.10 In 2012, the Department of Defense ad-
mitted that it discussed the pluses andminuses of providing Russia with classified data on
the “burn-out velocity” of the SM-3 interceptors that were planned to be deployed in Eu-
rope.11 In May 2013, James Syring, the director of the US Missile Defense Agency, con-
firmed that he had been asked by the Defense Secretary’s office for guidance on whether
particular pieces of missile defense information such as the speed of the US interceptors
were classified or not.12 If the Obama administration decides to declassify some technical
details of the US BMD, it may be seriously challenged by the Republicans in Congress, as
they strictly oppose sharing any data about American antimissile capabilities with Russia.
In exchange for a legally-binding transparency agreement, which Washington hopes
will allay Russia’s fears of the US BMD, the Obama administration wants negotiations
withMoscow with a view to reduce the ceiling on strategic nuclear warheads established
by the New START to 1000-1100 weapons (according to the Treaty’s counting rules),
that is, to decrease it by roughly 30 per cent. American experts said that this plan was
coherent with President Obama’s aspiration to “put an end to Cold War thinking” by
reducing “the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy”.13 In a more
practical context, it resulted from the revision of the US nuclear policy adopted in 2010.
Experts referred to an agreed draft of the directive, presuming that it would be “target-
ing fewer, but more important,
military or political sites in Russia,
China, and several other coun-
tries”.14
It seems that the USA’s renewed
approach to the BMD and strategic
weapons issues is in line with the
wider changes in the American foreign policy. The current US administration is focus-
ing upon domestic issues, reducing the defense budget and aspiring to avoid any new
involvement of the US in regional and local conflicts. Besides, as the gravity center of
the global economy and politics is moving to East Asia and the Pacific, the USA will pro-
gressively center its resources on these regions with a view to counteract China’s grow-
ing influence there. In this light the USA may be interested in reducing tensions with
Russia over the missile defense issue with a view to break the deadlock on a wide com-
plex of hard security and nuclear proliferation issues, including the hot problems of
nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe, and Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programs,
and also to ensure Russia’s support in managing regional crises – these days, especially
the one in Syria. The question, however, is whether these goals can be achieved.
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Russia’s response
Initially, Moscow’s reaction to the recent American suggestions was negative. Russian
officials reiterated that they wanted legally binding guarantees that the USA BMD is not
aimed against Russia. It seems, however, that by the end of April 2013 some new ele-
ments have appeared in Russia’s approach to the problem.
In particular, in an interview published on April 29, 2013, Sergey Lavrov, when answer-
ing a question about missile defense, uttered a few phrases that were not very rich in con-
tent: missile defense “still divides us”; “if the Russian Federation and the United States
bring their minds together, we can develop a common system which would be efficient
in protecting the Euro-Atlantic region from threats coming from outside this region”;
“inside the United States there are different opinions as to how to handle the problem of
missile proliferation, so we are reiterating our openness to discussing this issue with the
United States”.15 Yet he did not mention any legally binding guarantees, which is an in-
evitable element of Russian statements about the issue. In addition, Lavrov said that if
the USA, Russia and the Europeans “[found] a response to the threat of missile prolifera-
tion”, it would bring Russia and NATO’s relationship “to a qualitatively new level. It
[would really be us moving] a step closer to us becoming allies again like we used to be
duringWorldWar II”.16 This looks like a hint that a certain “big deal” between Russia and
theWest is possible only if the latter agrees with Moscow on the missile defense and pos-
es the following question: what sort of deal would Moscow like to propose to the West?
In addition, Russia resumed the inter-ministerial consultations with the USA on missile
defense. On May 1, 2013, the Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov met
with his American counterpart James Miller in Brussels. After the meeting Antonov said
that he hoped to continue these talks in Moscow at the end of May. He has also men-
tioned that “problems like the European missile defense should be handled on a multi-
lateral basis so that everyone realizes fully well the consequences of the decisions we
take”; this means that the European states should participate in the BMD talks. He
added that at “first glance, these U.S. proposals do not provide enough optimism for us
to say that in dealing with the problems of missile defense, we can break the deadlock
and achieve some kind of rapid breakthroughs” but “we are positive about the readiness
of our American colleagues to listen to us, to try to understand Russian concerns”, and
that transparency and confidence-building measures “should be part of a package of so-
lutions that could satisfy the Russian side”.17
In the mid-May 2013, the Russian media outlined a piece of information “from Russian
diplomatic sources” which said that Moscow “could well accept the US proposal” because
“more transparency in the missile defense field is useful both in and of itself and as an in-
strument to improvemutual confidence”. The source also noted that “if Moscow comes to
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the conclusion that the technical parameters of the USmissile defense elements it receives
under this agreement show that Washington’s plans do pose a threat to its deterrence
forces, it will be unable to affect them anyhow, as the agreement provides only for ex-
change of information”. Therefore, Russia will still continue to insist on long-term legally-
binding agreements not only in order to improve transparency but also in order to guar-
antee that the US missile defense systems are not directed against its nuclear potential.18
Finally, the current Russian reaction to the US proposals for BMD has been outlined by
the Secretary of the Russian Security Council NikolayPatrushev, who has delivered
Putin’s reply letter to Washington. In an interview published on May 25, 2013, Patru-
shev said that “in principle” Obama’s suggestions “are heading in the right direction”,
yet they are not enough. He said, “We value the readiness to ensure the transparency of
the BMD programs … [but] ... we need clear and solid guarantees that the development
of the anti-missile assets of the USA and its allies will not undermine the efficiency of
the Russian strategic deterrence”.19
Thus, a possible outline of Russia’s current approach is the following: Moscow most
probably agrees that it should negotiate a legally binding agreement with the USA on
transparency and confidence building measures. The decision to start the talks on this
agreement may be taken at the Putin-Obama meeting on the sidelines of the G8 Sum-
mit in late June 2013 or on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in September 2013. At the
same time, Moscow continues demanding legally binding guarantees that the US BMD
is not aimed against its strategic forces. In addition, the Kremlin may propose, or may
have proposed already, some trilateral consultations on BMD between the USA, Russia
and Europe with a view to involve some European circles that are skeptical about mis-
sile defense in the debate.
Is there a threat to the Russian strategic force?
The key argument of Russia is that the deployment of the SM-3 Block IIA/B interceptors
negates or may negate its strategic forces. If this point is technically grounded, then the
West should think of how to mitigate the Russian fears, yet if it is not, then Moscow us-
es it with political goals in view, above all to force the USA and Europe to accept the
Russian demands regarding a number of hard security issues.
Russian officials do not present any proof of a threat posed by the US BMD to the Russ-
ian strategic deterrent that is based on a comparison of the performance characteristics
of Russian ballistic missiles and those of the US missile defense systems. At the same
time, some high-ranking Russian military officials in actual fact deny the Russian gov-
ernment’s political position. For instance, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian
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Strategic Rocket Troops, Lieutenant-General Sergey Karakaev, said that for Russia, today,
the BMD systems Patriot and SM-3 “do not present any threat. The speed of their inter-
ceptors could be, at most, 5 km/sec. The speed of our warheads is more than 8 km/sec.
Thus, simply put, American interceptors cannot catch up with our missiles.”20 It is im-
portant that Karakaev has mentioned the speed of 5 km/sec since this is the burnout ve-
locity which most American inde-
pendent experts attributed to the
SM-3 Block IIA/B interceptors. Fur-
thermore, on April 16, 2013,
Dmitry Rogozin, the Deputy
Prime Minister in charge of de-
fense industry, said that “we have
solved the issue of penetrating the
U.S. missile shield and it poses no
military threat to the country”.21
Russian and American experts ful-
ly agree that only a few Russian
strategic missiles’ trajectories to the USA, namely those stretching from the ICBMs bases
in the European part of the country to targets on the American East Coast, pass near
EPAA assets. At the same time, the majority of the Russian missile trajectories to the
USA, including those of all the ICBMs stationed in Siberia, take a Polar route, and under
no circumstances can they be intercepted by the BMD components deployed in Europe.
The American side provided some technical arguments proving that the EPAA cannot
harm Russia’s strategic force. In particular, the BMD computers can calculate “a fire con-
trol solution” only after an enemy’s missile, which has to be intercepted, achieves
burnout. During the boost phase the missile’s trajectory is not ballistic, and it must be
on a ballistic trajectory for any BMD system to compute an intercept solution. Madelyn
Creedon, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense, said, “It is simply not the case that U.S.
interceptors can launch prior to burnout. … We need the time after burnout for target-
ing, and the interceptors are not fast enough in any event.”22 According to the official
American assessments, which assume perfect sensor aptitudes, an interceptor launch
will not occur until approximately 60 seconds after the threat missile’s boost flight ends
and the initial ballistic trajectory track is established, at the earliest. This means that the
SM-3 interceptors may launch “approximately 190 to 240 seconds after a threat missile
launch”.23 As a result these interceptors simply will not be able to catch up with Russian
ballistic missiles flying toward America over Europe.
By and large, this conclusion is supported by a few highly knowledgeable Russian experts,
including Colonel-General Victor Yesin, the former Chief of Staff of the Russian Rocket
Missile Troops, and a number of his former colleagues, albeit their calculations did not
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take into account the just mentioned argument about the time lag between the burnout
and the interceptor launch. Their conclusions are summarized in the following table:
Key factors of a successful intercept of Russian Results:
ICBMs travelling over Europe for interceptors
with a burn-out speed of 5.5 km/sec:
ICBM Time between the
type and start of the ICBM
Location of burn-out and the start of the
ICBM base time interceptor
Tver Oblast Topol-M, 200 sec The interceptor may be at the
170 sec potential intercept point 3 minutes
later than a threat missile;
intercept impossible
Tver Oblast Topol-M, 100 sec The interceptor may be at the
170 sec potential intercept point 80 seconds
later than a threat missile;
intercept impossible
Saratov SS-19, 320 sec Intercept impossible as the
Oblast 340 sec interceptor cannot reach the
altitude of 1450 km at a 2000 km
distance from the launching point
Kaluzhskaya SS-19, ? Intercept is possible; it requires
Oblast 340 sec 5–10 interceptors per target
warhead or missile to implement a
kinetic intercept
Source: S. M. Rogov, S. N. Babich, V. I. Yesin, P. S. Zolotarev, V. S. Kuznetzov and
others: Desyat let bez dogovora po PRO. Problema protivoraketnoi oborony
v rossiisko-amerikanskich otnosheniyah (Ten years without the ABM Treaty.
The BMD problem in the Russian-American relations). Moscow, 2012, p. 44–46.
There are different assessments of whether the American GBIs deployed in Alaska and
California may be effective against Russian ICBMs or not. For instance, General Yesin re-
vealed that from his “contacts with the director of the Missile Defense Agency”, he had
“learned that the Americans will need five to seven interceptors to engage one (single
warhead – Y. F.) Topol-M missile”.24 Or to pose it differently, a GBI force of 44 intercep-
tors, which the USA plans to have by 2017, can intercept no more than eight Russian
strategic warheads, while by 2020 Russia may have at least about 1000 of them.
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Moscow’s goals
An agreement on missile defense transparency will provide Moscow with an access to
some sensitive American data about BMD technologies. In addition, it will be portrayed
by Russia’s propaganda as evidence of its flexibility and its good-will approach to cru-
cial hard security issues, and also as an essential concession to the Obama administra-
tion. Besides, Moscow’s consent to conclude this agreement can result from its interest
in some easing of the tensions in the relations with the West. Such an easing of the ten-
sions would have the purpose of “freezing” the implementation of the “Magnitsky Act”
in the United States and preventing the adoption of similar laws in Europe; and in a
wider context, another purpose for it would be to mitigate Western criticism of human
rights violations in Russia.
Yet it does not mean that Russia’s long-term strategy towards the West is changing. In
particular, there are no signs that Moscow will consent to start talks with the USA on
further reductions of the strategic
nuclear weapons. In this light,
Moscow uses and most probably
will use the US refusal to fully sat-
isfy the Russian politically motivated but not technically grounded demands related to
missile defense to justify its own military build-up, including its build-up of strategic
nuclear weapons, and to discredit America by portraying it as the main obstacle for the
limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons.
In a wider geopolitical context, the Russian policy towards the BMD issue results also
from Moscow’s perception of the US quest for a compromise on strategic problems as a
weakness, which confirms the of-
ficially accepted view that “the
historical West’s potential to dom-
inate in the global economy and
politics is continuing to dimin-
ish”.25 The concept of the USA’s
progressing weakness may be and
most probably is used by Moscow
to question the reliability of American alliance obligations, including their reliability in
the eyes of the leaders of Asian countries, who are particularly sensitive to what they
consider as a loss of face.
However, it cannot be ruled out that a certain “big deal” between the two countries, at
the possibility of which Lavrov hinted, will come about. This 'big deal' would include
Russia’s consent to new negotiations on further reductions of strategic nuclear weapons
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Yet it does not mean that
Russia’s long-term strategy
towards the West is changing
The Russian policy towards the
BMD issue results also from
Moscow’s perception of the US
quest for a compromise on
strategic problems as a
weakness
in exchange for the USA’s consent to limit its non-nuclear strategic systems, take into
account the conventional arms in Europe, limit the US naval activity in the seas around
Europe and accept some Russian proposals on European security aimed at enfeebling
NATO.
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